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A UML PROFILE FOR ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL 
SUMMARY 
When building an access control aware system, domain specifications are designed 
typically separate from security specifications. Main reason of this separation is 
representing security design models as structured text like policy files on the other 
hand visualizing domain specifications by graphical models like Unified Modeling 
Language (UML) models. This causes a gap between security modeling and system 
design modeling. Even if security modeling is structured at the early phases of 
development, security mechanisms are placed in to the system at the final phases, 
this causes another gap in the middle. These gaps affect security and maintainability 
of the resulting system in a bad way.  
This study presents a solution that uses Model Driven Architecture (MDA) approach 
for bridging these gaps. A UML Profile for Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is 
proposed. With this UML Profile, access control specifications can be modeled 
graphically together with problem domain specifications from the beginning of the 
design phase, making it possible to extend security integration over the entire 
development process.  
Major contribution of this study is introducing a UML Profile for RBAC, to integrate 
security specifications of access control into the development process from the 
beginning; to form a well-defined Platform Independent Model (PIM) that can be 
used to automatically generate the corresponding Platform Specific Model (PSM) or 
generate code directly by transformation functions; to maintain technology 
independence and reusability, transformation functions handle technology-specific 
details; to simplify the work of developers; to benefit from the advantage of wide-
range of commercial and non-commercial Computer-Aided Software Engineering 
(CASE) tools support by using easily interchangeable and lightweight UML 
extension mechanism. Additional contributions are employing significant RBAC 
constraints like Static Separation of Duty (SSD) and Dynamic Separation of Duty 
(DSD) into the profile, and introducing how Object Constraint Language (OCL) is 
used to validate well-formedness (syntax) and meaning (semantics) of information 
models against the RBAC. 
 
  xiv
  xv
ROL-TABANLI ERİŞİM DENETİMİ İÇİN BİR UML PROFİLİ 
ÖZET 
Erişim denetiminin yapılacağı bir sistem oluşturulurken domen isterleri genellikle 
güvenlik isterlerinden ayrı olarak tasarlanır. Bu ayrımın başlıca sebebi güvenlik 
tasarım modelleri, ilke dosyaları gibi yapılandırılmış metin olarak ifade edilirken 
domen isterlerinin birleştirilmiş modelleme dili (UML) modelleri gibi grafiksel 
modellerle görselleştirilmeleridir. Bu ayrım güvenlik modellemesi ve sistem tasarım 
modellemesi arasında bir boşluk oluşmasına sebep olur. Güvenlik modellemesi, 
geliştirmenin erken safhalarında biçimlendirilse bile güvenlik mekanizmalarının 
sisteme dâhil edilmesi geliştirmenin son safhalarında yapılır. Buda geliştirmenin ara 
safhalarında başka bir boşluğun oluşmasına sebep olur. Bahsedilen bu boşluklar 
ortaya çıkan sistemin güvenliğini ve bakım kolaylığını kötü yönde etkiler. 
Bu çalışmada, bahsedilen boşlukların doldurulabilmesi için model güdümlü mimari 
(MDA) yaklaşımıyla, Rol-Tabanlı Erişim Denetimi (RBAC) için bir UML Profili 
geliştirilerek çözüm önerisi getirilmiştir. Bu UML Profili, tasarım aşamasının 
başında erişim denetim isterlerinin domen isterleriyle birlikte grafiksel olarak 
modellenebilmesini sağlayarak güvenlik entegrasyonunun geliştirme sürecinin 
tamamına yayılacak şekilde yapılabilmesine olanak sağlar. 
Bu çalışmanın başlıca katkısı, erişim denetimi isterlerini geliştirme sürecine en 
başından itibaren dâhil edebilmek; dönüşüm fonksiyonlarının otomatik olarak ilgili 
platforma özel model (PSM) veya direkt kod üretebilmesi için iyi tanımlanmış bir 
platform bağımsız model (PIM) oluşturabilmek; dönüşüm fonksiyonlarının 
teknolojiye özel detayları kotarabilmesi sayesinde teknoloji bağımsızlığı ve tekrar 
kullanabilirliği sağlayabilmek;  geliştiricilerin işlerini kolaylaştırabilmek; kolaylıkla 
değiş tokuş edilebilir ve hafif sıklet bir UML genişletme mekanizması kullanarak çok 
sayıda ticari ve ticari olmayan bilgisayar destekli sistem mühendisliği (CASE) 
aracının desteğinden faydalanabilmek amacıyla RBAC için bir UML Profili ortaya 
çıkarmaktır. Ayrıca statik görevler ayrılığı (SSD) ve dinamik görevler ayrılığı (DSD) 
gibi önemli RBAC kısıtlarını profile dâhil etmek ve RBAC’a dayalı modellerin 
biçimsel (sentaktik) ve anlamsal (semantik) olarak iyi durumda olup olmadığının 
denetiminin yapılabilmesi için nesne kısıt dilinin (OCL) nasıl kullanıldığını tanıtmak 
diğer katkılarıdır. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This thesis describes and illustrates the proposed UML Profile for RBAC, which is 
used for bridging security modeling and system design modeling. With this UML 
Profile, access control specifications and problem domain specifications can be 
designed together with graphical models and UML notations from the beginning of 
the design phase. The model to that the proposed UML Profile applied, forms the 
PIM that can be used by transformation functions to generate corresponding code or 
PSM. SSD, DSD, prerequisite, cardinality and time-based constraints, which are 
significant RBAC constraints, are employed in the UML Profile. OCL is used to 
express UML Profile constraints that are used to validate well-formedness and check 
RBAC constraint rules of the PIM. 
1.1 Motivation 
Model building is a standard software engineering practice. Model construction 
during the initial phases of development process, like requirement analysis and 
system design, provides a foundation for early analysis of the problems and fault 
detection. As a result, it improves the quality of the resulting system. If the model is 
formal enough, it can be used to generate the corresponding code. Model building is 
also used for security requirements but its integration into the overall development 
process is problematic and suffers from two “gaps” [1]. First gap is the separation 
between system design modeling and security modeling. Main reason of this 
separation is representing security design models as structured text like policy files 
on the other hand visualizing domain specifications by graphical models like UML 
models. Even if security modeling is structured at the early phases of development, 
security mechanisms are placed into the system at the final phases, this causes 
second gap in the middle. These gaps affect security and maintainability of the 
resulting system in a bad way. 
Access control is a security technology that is applied extensively to protect system 
resources against inappropriate or undesired user access. Many models have been 
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developed and studied to construct and manage access control systems [2][3][4]. For 
the last two decades, RBAC [5] has been very popular among access control systems 
and has been widely accepted because of its ability to reduce the complexity and cost 
of security administration. Under RBAC, security administration is greatly simplified 
by using roles, hierarchies, and constraints to organize privileges [6]. In recent years, 
vendors have begun implementing RBAC features in their products like database 
management systems, security management and network operating system products, 
without general agreement on the definition of RBAC features. ANSI INCITS 
RBAC standard [7] aims to resolve uncertainty and confusion about utility and 
meaning of RBAC by using a reference model to define RBAC features and then 
describing the functional specifications for those features. Currently, in most 
companies, a security administrator manually creates and manages the specification 
policies for RBAC systems as an independent procedure during the deployment stage 
after the software design and development. It is very difficult and time consuming to 
create these policies because of their complex syntax. A UML Profile for RBAC can 
solve the problem of late integration of security into the entire system development 
process and simplify creation of the complex policies as well. 
Access control specifications could be designed graphically in a language like UML 
[8]. Resulting security model could be merged with system design model. UML 
Profiles [8][9] can be used to mark system design model elements as domain 
specific, here is RBAC, elements and add new building blocks for domain specific 
concepts. Just modeling may not be enough to make it formal for generating security 
infrastructure components. It may be supported by a constraint language for syntactic 
and semantic checking of the model, and generating access control checking 
mechanism of the resulting system. OCL [10] is the expression language for the 
UML and appropriate for this kind of support.  
1.2 Suggested Approach 
This study proposes to use a UML Profile for RBAC to solve the issues raised in 
Section 1.1. Key components of the proposed UML Profile are; stereotypes, tagged 
values and OCL constraints. Stereotypes represent basic elements and constraints of 
the RBAC. Tagged values are used for defining additional attributes for constraints 
and making relations between profile elements. OCL constraints are used for 
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validating well-formedness of the system model to that this profile is applied and for 
checking SSD, DSD, prerequisite, cardinality and time-based constraint violations.  
1.3 Contributions 
The main contributions of this thesis are as follows:  
• Introducing a UML Profile for RBAC 
o to integrate security specifications of access control into the 
development process from the beginning. 
o to form a well-defined PIM in MDA approach [11]. The PIM can be 
used by transformation functions to automatically generate the 
corresponding PSM or directly generate code. 
o to maintain technology independence and reusability. Access control 
technology will evolve or change in time but models and 
specifications will remain. Transformation functions handle 
technology-specific details. Using new or updated transformation 
functions will be enough to adapt to the new technology.  
o to simplify the work of developers. Developers who take part directly 
in the application design process can easily add security specifications 
to the model without expertise on security issues, and security 
administrators who may not understand the software structure and 
details of problem domain well enough do not need to define complex 
security policies rather they may focus on transformation functions. 
Transformation functions for well-known access control 
infrastructures may be ready to use so developers will just use them to 
generate code, policies or whatever needed. 
o to benefit from the advantage of wide-range of CASE-tools support. 
UML Profiles are lightweight and easily interchangeable UML 
extensions. They have a wide-range of commercial and non-
commercial CASE-tools support. Therefore, users can easily deploy 
these extensions to their already using CASE-tools that support UML 
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Profile. XML Metadata Interchange (XMI) [12] format is used for the 
proposed UML Profile to be interchanged. 
• Employing significant RBAC constraints like SSD, DSD, prerequisite, 
cardinality and time-based constraints into the profile.  
• Introducing how OCL is used to validate well-formedness and meaning of 
information models against the RBAC. 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the background of 
the RBAC, the MDA approach, the UML, the UML Profile and the OCL. It also 
compares this proposed approach with related works. Section 3 defines the proposed 
UML Profile for RBAC. Section 4 introduces an example design problem and shows 
how the proposed UML Profile for RBAC is applied to the example design model. 
Section 5 presents conclusions and future work.   
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2.  BACKGROUND 
This section gives general background information about the RBAC, the UML, the 
OCL and the MDA approach. Furthermore, the proposed approach is compared with 
related works. 
2.1 RBAC 
Using roles to separate access control privileges was first introduced in 1992 [5]. A 
key feature of this study is that all access is through roles. A role is essentially a 
collection of permissions, and all users receive permissions only through the roles to 
which they are assigned. In 1996, Sandhu and colleagues [13] introduced a 
framework of RBAC models, RBAC96. The RBAC model has been widely discussed 
and further developed since then. In 2000, NIST initiated an effort to establish an 
international consensus standard for RBAC, publishing a proposal [14] in the ACM 
RBAC workshop. In 2004, the standard was approved as INCITS 359-2004 [7] by 
the InterNational Committee for Information Technology (INCITS) standards, which 
is accredited by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) to develop 
industry consensus standards for IT. 
The RBAC can be stated formally using the notions of users, roles, permissions, 
operations, resources and sessions, and the relationships between these entities. An 
operation is an active process invoked by a user who wants to access protected 
system resources. Permissions are authorizations to perform operations on the 
resources. A Role is a job function or job title within the organization and associated 
with some permissions. Users grant permissions by being member of appropriate 
roles. This greatly simplifies management of permissions. Within an organization, 
roles are relatively stable, while users and permissions are both numerous and may 
change rapidly. If a user’s responsibilities or qualifications are changed, he can be 
easily reassigned from one role to another. The access of users to the information is 
regulated based on their assigned roles. RBAC also includes the notion of user 
sessions. A user establishes a session during which he activates a subset of the roles 
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assigned to him. Each user can activate multiple sessions; however, each session is 
associated with only one user. The operations that a user can perform in a session 
depend on the roles activated in that session and the permissions associated with 
those roles.  The session concept, which is a critical part of the RBAC, distinguishes 
RBAC from traditional group mechanisms [15]. Without sessions, all roles that are 
assigned to users, are always activated. This can potentially violate least privilege 
rule. 
This study is based on the RBAC model defined in the ANSI INCITS 359-2004 
standard [7]. In this RBAC standard, the RBAC model is defined in terms of four 
model components; Core RBAC, Hierarchical RBAC, Static Separation of Duty 
(SSD) Relations, and Dynamic Separation of Duty (DSD) Relations. 
2.1.1 Core RBAC 
Core RBAC defines a minimum collection of RBAC elements as defined above; 
users, roles, permissions, operations, resources (objects) and sessions, element sets 
and relations like user-role assignment and permission-role assignment, considered 
fundamental in any RBAC system. In addition, Core RBAC introduces the concept 
of role activation as part of user’s session within a computer system. Core RBAC is 
required in any RBAC system. Core RBAC includes sets of six basic data elements, 
which are defined in Figure 2.1 [7], called users (USERS), roles (ROLES), objects 
(OBS), operations (OPS), permissions (PRMS) and sessions (SESSIONS).  
 
Figure 2.1 : Core RBAC 
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2.1.2 Hierarchical RBAC 
The Hierarchical RBAC component, which is indicated in Figure 2.2 [7], adds 
relations for supporting role hierarchies. A hierarchy is mathematically a partial 
order defining seniority relation between roles, whereby senior roles acquire the 
permissions of their juniors. In the absence of role hierarchies, it is inefficient and 
administratively cumbersome to specify general permissions repeatedly for a large 
number of roles, or to assign large numbers of users to general roles [6]. Authorized 
roles of a user include all assigned roles and their direct and indirect junior roles. 
 
Figure 2.2 : Hierarchical RBAC 
2.1.3 SSD Relations 
SSD Relations adds exclusivity relations among roles with respect to user 
assignment. Conflict of interest in a role-based system may arise because of a user 
gaining authorization for permissions associated with conflicting roles. One means of 
preventing this form of conflict of interest is though SSD, that is, to enforce 
constraints on the assignment of users to roles. This means that if a user is assigned 
to one of the conflicting roles, the user is prohibited from being member of another 
conflicting role. Because of the potential inconsistencies with respect to SSD 
relations and inheritance relations of a role hierarchy, the SSD relations model 
component defines relations in both the presence, as illustrated in Figure 2.3 [7], and 
absence of role hierarchies. 
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Figure 2.3 : SSD Relations 
2.1.4 DSD Relations 
DSD relations, as illustrated in Figure 2.4 [7], define exclusivity relations with 
respect to the roles that are activated as a part of a user’s session. DSD relations, like 
SSD relations, are intended to limit the permissions that are available to a user. 
However, DSD relations differ from SSD relations by the context in which these 
limitations are imposed. SSD relations define and place constraints on a user’s total 
permission space but DSD relations limit the availability of the permissions over a 
user’s permission space by placing constraints on the roles that can be activated 
within or across a user’s sessions.  
 
Figure 2.4 : DSD Relations 
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2.2 MDA 
The MDA is an approach to separate the specification of the operation of a system 
from the details of the way that system uses the capabilities of its platform [11]. 
MDA provides an approach for, and enables tools to be provided for: 
• specifying a system independently of the platform that supports it, 
• specifying platforms, 
• choosing a particular platform for the system, and 
• transforming the system specification into one for a particular platform. 
The three primary goals of MDA are portability, interoperability and reusability 
through architectural separation of concerns. The keystones in MDA are the models 
and model elements; hence, it is important to use a well-defined modeling language, 
such as UML, to describe each model precisely. The aim of MDA is that a PIM 
(high-level model) can be transformed into a PSM (low-level model), as illustrated in 
Figure 2.5. Therefore, to develop software system it is only have to be designed its 
conceptual schema with all constraints using UML and OCL respectively. 
The MDA process is divided into three steps: 
1. Build a PIM, that is, a conceptual model of the desired system, which is 
independent of any implementation technology. 
2. Transform the PIM into a PSM that is based on elements and concepts of the 
implementation in a specific technology. 
3. Transform the PSM into code. A tool might transform a PIM directly into 
deployable code, without producing a PSM, which means Step 2 might be 
skipped. 
2.3 UML 
The Unified Modeling Language (UML) [8] is a widely used graphical language for 
modeling object-oriented systems. It helps users to specify, visualize, construct and 
document the components of software systems during the design and development 
phase. UML supports the description of the structure and behavior of systems using 
different model element types and corresponding diagram types. The class diagram, 
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which is focused in this study, is one of these defined diagram types to provide a 
structural view of information in a system.  
 
Figure 2.5 : Model Transformation in MDA Approach 
2.3.1 Class Diagram 
The structural aspects of systems are defined using classes; each class represents a 
group of things that have common services, properties, and behavior. Services are 
described by functions, and properties are described by attributes and associations. 
Every class participating in an association is connected to the association by an 
association end, which may also specify the role name of the class and its cardinality 
in the association. Classes and their relations are depicted in class diagrams. 
2.3.2 UML Profile 
UML Profile [8][9] is a kind of UML extension mechanism. It specializes some of 
the language’s elements, imposes new restrictions on them while respecting the 
UML metamodel and leaving the original semantics of the UML elements 
unchanged. Icons and symbols can be specified for these specialized elements. The 
Object Management Group (OMG) maintains some common and widely accepted 
profiles, such as UML Profile for CORBA [16] and UML Testing Profile [17]. 
UML Profiles are defined in terms of three basic mechanisms: stereotypes, tagged 
values, and constraints [9] that allow tailoring it to fit the needs of a specific domain.  
A stereotype defines how an existing metaclass may be extended. It can be used to 
create platform or domain specific terminology or notation in addition to, or in place 
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of, the ones used for the extended metaclass. A tagged value is an additional meta-
attribute that is attached to a metaclass extended by a stereotype. A tagged value has 
a name and a type, and is member of a specific stereotype. Constraints are expressed 
in OCL or natural language and can be associated with stereotypes. They impose 
restrictions on the corresponding metamodel elements. In this way, the properties of 
a well-formed model can be defined. 
2.4 OCL 
Object Constraint Language (OCL) [10], which is part of the UML, is used to 
express constraints and properties of model elements in a formal way. OCL, which is 
based on first-order logic, is a textual language that describes constraints on the 
UML model with expressions. These expressions typically specify invariant 
conditions that must hold for the system being modeled or queries over objects 
described in a model. Note that when the OCL expressions are evaluated, they do not 
have side effects, which means their evaluation cannot alter the state of the 
corresponding executing system. Expressions can be used in a number of places in a 
UML model: 
• to specify the initial value of an attribute or association end 
• to specify the derivation rule for an attribute or association end 
• to specify the body of an operation 
• to indicate an instance in a dynamic diagram 
• to indicate a condition in a dynamic diagram 
• to indicate actual parameter values in a dynamic diagram 
There are four types of constraints defined in OCL, shown in Table 2.1. 
In OCL expressions, there can be used 
• basic types like Integer, Real, String and Boolean;  
• basic operations that can be used with the basic types, like 
mathematical operations, string operations and Boolean operations;  
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• collections that are structured data types that allow encapsulating 
more than one element of a same type inside, like Set, Bag, 
OrderedSet and Sequence; 
• operations on collections like select, reject, collect, forAll, exists, 
iterate and any. 
Table 2.1 : OCL Constraints Types 
OCL Constraints Type Description 
Invariant 
An invariant object normally attaches with a class 
diagram. It is a constraint that states additional rules that 
must always be obeyed by all objects of the class, type or 
interface that are defined in the class diagram. 
Precondition A precondition is used to restrict a condition that must be true before an operation executes. 
Post-condition A post-condition is used to restrict a condition that must be true after an operation executes. 
Guard A guard is used to restrict a condition that must be true before a transition in a state machine happens. 
A Set is a container where each element inside appears only one time. Therefore, it 
does not contain duplicate elements. A Bag is like a Set but with duplications 
allowed. Moreover, OrderedSet and Sequence are the same as Set and Bag in which 
the elements are ordered.  
2.5 Related Works 
In literature, there are some studies about visualizing RBAC elements and constraints 
in UML [18][19] and OCL representation of RBAC constraints [20][21]. None of 
these studies points out a UML Profile that can be used for the both purposes. Basin 
D. et al. [1] propose an approach, Model Driven Security (MDS), to build secure 
systems. This approach is very close to the approach that is used in this study, in 
bridging “gaps” between security models and system design models but they define a 
new modeling language directly using Meta-Object Facility (MOF) [22]. In this 
approach, developers should use an extra tool besides their modeling tool, or leave it 
at all. In other words, a new modeling language requires a new CASE-tool. In 
contrast, UML Profile is a lightweight UML extension and does not require an extra 
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tool. Developers can easily deploy a UML Profile to their CASE-tools. Moreover, in 
MDS, it is not mentioned how to employ RBAC constraints [7][20] into the model. 
Another close approach to this subject was proposed by Jin X. [23]. She proposes a 
framework to provide support for modeling the RBAC system in eXtensible Access 
Control Markup Language (XACML) [24] architecture and automatic generation of 
policy specification in XACML format. This study uses UML Profile mechanism to 
integrate security to system development cycle but the profile contains both RBAC 
elements and XACML elements like Rule and Policy, and only contains SSD RBAC 
constraint. In contrast to this study, the proposed approach is for just RBAC elements 
and includes critical RBAC constraints like SSD, DSD, prerequisite, cardinality and 
time-based constraints. XACML could be a PSM and developers may not know 
about XACML elements. Developers can design just PIM with the proposed UML 
Profile for their problem domain. Transformation functions can handle this kind of 
platform specific details if it is needed. 
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3.  RBAC UML PROFILE 
The proposed UML Profile for RBAC has stereotypes, tagged values and constraints 
to define a way of modeling RBAC elements and constraints.  
3.1 Conceptual Model 
The proposed UML Profile includes all elements of the four model components of 
RBAC, which is mentioned in Section 2.1. Figure 3.1 shows conceptual model of the 
standard RBAC elements, constraints and their relations, and some additional 
elements; prerequisite roles, time-based constraint and critical permission. A role 
can have one or more prerequisite roles means a user can be assigned to this role 
only if the user is already authorized for those prerequisite roles. Time-based 
constraints are used to restrict sessions to be established in only allowed time 
intervals. Operations of a critical task are divided over roles, exclusive roles, by 
assigning these operations to critical permissions. Every exclusive role in a 
Separation of Duty (SoD) relation should be assigned to at least one critical 
permission for that critical task. A critical permission can be assigned to only one 
role. Critical permissions could not be shared among roles so it guarantees 
consistency of user-exclusive role assignment and exclusive role-permission 
assignment, for more information look at [6] p. 107-117.  As shown in Figure 3.1, 
the relations between users and roles, permissions and roles, and operations and 
permissions are many-to-many. A resource can have one or more operations. A user 
can establish multiple sessions and can activate one or more authorized roles in a 
session. A role can have one or more junior roles for the role inheritance relations.  A 
role can have one or more prerequisite roles for the prerequisite constraint. An SoD 
has at least two exclusive roles. SSD and DSD generalize SoD. Upper limit property 
of the SoD kind element is a natural number ≥2 that no user is assigned to this much 
or more roles (for SSD), no user can activate in a session this much or more roles 
(for DSD), included in the exclusive roles set. A CriticalPermission, which is a 
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Permission, has at least one SoD element shows for which critical task it is created. A 
TimeConstraint has a property for session it constraints. 
 
Figure 3.1 : Conceptual model of RBAC elements and constraints 
3.2 Proposed UML Profile for RBAC 
The proposed UML Profile can be expressed in three parts; RBAC Core 
Components, Hierarchical RBAC and Constrained RBAC, to represent four model 
components of the RBAC standard and additional RBAC constraints. All three parts 
of the UML Profile has stereotypes, tagged values and constraints. All these 
stereotypes and their relations are shown in Figure 3.2. 
RBAC Core Components part of the proposed UML Profile contains User, Role, 
Resource, Operation, Permission, Session, ResourceAssignment, UserAssignment 
and PermissionAssignment stereotypes that are described in Section 3.2.1-3.2.9. 
Hierarchical RBAC part contains RoleInheritance stereotype that is described in 
Section 3.2.10. Constrained RBAC part contains SoD, SSD, DSD, CriticalPermission 
and TimeConstraint stereotypes that ate described in Section 3.2.11-3.2.15. 
There are OCL expressions that are embedded as owned rules in its constrained 
stereotype in the UML Profile, in the tables of stereotype definitions. Those 
expressions use some general OCL definitions that are described in Section 3.3. 
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Figure 3.2 : RBAC UML Profile
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3.2.1 User Stereotype 
It represents a human being, machine, network or anything that want to access 
system resources. 
Icon :  
Base Class : UML::Class 
Parent : N/A 
Tagged Values : 
- maxAssignedRoleCount : Integer [1] = -1: maximum number of roles that can be 
assigned to this user. 
- maxActivatedRoleCount : Integer [1] = -1: maximum number of roles that can be 
activated by this user in a session. 
Constraints : 
[1] Number of the assigned roles of a user should not exceed its 
maxAssignedRoleCount value. 
inv maxAssignedRoleCount :  
self.isUser implies self.asUser.maxAssignedRoleCount>-1 implies 
self.assignedUserRoles(self)->size()<=self.asUser.maxAssignedRoleCount 
[2] Number of the activated roles in a session should not exceed session owner’s 
maxActivatedRoleCount value. 
inv maxActivatedRoleCount : 
self.isUser implies self.asUser.maxActivatedRoleCount>-1 implies 
self.establishedUserSessions(self)->forAll(endType->select(isRole)-> 
size()<=self.maxActivatedRoleCount) 
 
3.2.2 Role Stereotype 
It represents a job function or job title within the context of an organization. 
Icon :  
Base Class : UML::Class 
Parent : N/A 
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Tagged Values : 
- maxPermissionCount : Integer [1] = -1: maximum number of permissions that 
can be assigned to this role. 
- maxUserCount : Integer [1] = -1: maximum number of users that can be assigned 
to this role. 
- prerequisiteRoles : Role [*]: prerequisite roles for this role. 
Constraints : 
[1] Number of the assigned permissions of a role should not exceed its 
maxPermissionCount value. 
inv maxRolePermissionCount : 
self.isRole implies self.asRole.maxPermissionCount>-1 implies 
self.assignedRolePermissions(self)->size()<=self.asRole.maxPermissionCount 
[2] Number of the assigned users of a role should not exceed its maxUserCount 
value. 
inv maxUserCount : 
self.isRole implies self.asRole.maxUserCount>-1 implies 
self.assignedRoleUsers(self)->size()<=self.asRole.maxUserCount 
[3] All generalizations of a Role should be RoleInheritance stereotyped 
generalizations. 
inv inheritanceShouldBeRoleInheritance:  
self.isRole implies self.generalization->forAll(isRoleInheritance) 
[4] PrerequisiteRoles tagged value should not include the owner Role stereotyped 
class. 
inv prerequisiteSelfContain : 
self.isRole implies not self.asRole.prerequisiteRoles-> 
iterate(r;res:Set(Class)=Set{} | res->including(r.base_Class))->includes(self) 
[5] Roles that are included in prerequisiteRoles tagged value, and their all parents 
which means its direct and indirect ancestors, and the tagged value’s owner role and 
its all parents should not form a role set that violates the SSD constraint. 
inv prerequisiteSSDConsistency :  
self.isRole implies self.asRole.prerequisiteRoles->notEmpty() implies let 
authorisedRequiredRoles : Set(Class) = allFamily(prerequisites(self)-> 
union(Set{self.base_Class})) in self.allSSDs->forAll(ssd | sodRoles(ssd)-> 
intersection(authorisedRequiredRoles)->size()<ssd.extension_SoD.upperLimit) 
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[6] If a CriticalPermission is assigned to a role, this role should be included in 
separatedRoles tagged value of all SoD elements that are specified in sods tagged 
value of that CriticalPermission.  
inv shouldBeInSoD :  
self.isRole implies assignedRoleCriticalPermissions(self)->forAll(cp | 
cp.asCriticalPermission.sods->forAll(cps : RBAC::SoD | 
sodRoles(cps.base_Class)->includes(self))) 
 
3.2.3 Resource Stereotype 
It represents an object that must be protected against inappropriate or undesired 
access. 
Icon :  
Base Class : UML::Class 
Parent : N/A 
Tagged Values : 
- maxPermissionCount : Integer [1] = -1: maximum number of permissions that 
can be assigned to this resource. 
Constraints : 
[1] Number of the assigned permissions of a resource should not exceed its 
maxPermissionCount value. 
inv maxResorcePermissionCount : 
self.isResource implies self.asResource.maxPermissionCount>-1 implies 
self.assignedResourcePermissions(self)-> 
size()<=self.asResource.maxPermissionCount 
 
3.2.4 Operation Stereotype 
It is used to mark functions of the Resource stereotyped classes as protected. 
Functions are used to access information of the class or make changes on the state of 
the system, which makes them ideal to represent Operations on Resources in RBAC 
context. 
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Icon :  
Base Class : UML::Operation 
Parent : N/A 
Tagged Values : N/A 
Constraints : 
[1] Owner class of the Operation stereotyped function should be Resource 
stereotyped class. 
inv operationEncloser : 
self.isOperation implies self.owner.isResource 
 
3.2.5 Permission Stereotype 
It represents an approval to perform operations on protected resources. 
Icon :  
Base Class : UML::Class 
Parent : N/A 
Tagged Values : 
- maxResourceCount : Integer [1] = -1: maximum number of resources that can be 
assigned to this permission. 
- maxRoleCount : Integer [1] = -1: maximum number of roles that can be assigned 
to this permission. 
Constraints : 
[1] Number of the assigned resources of a permission should not exceed its 
maxResourceCount value. 
inv maxResourceCount : 
self.isPermission implies  
self.asPermission.maxResourceCount>-1 implies 
self.assignedPermissionResources(self)-> 
size()<=self.asPermission.maxResourceCount 
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[2] Number of the assigned roles of a permission should not exceed its 
maxRoleCount value. 
inv maxRoleCount : 
self.isPermission implies self.asPermission.maxRoleCount>-1 implies 
self.assignedPermissionRoles(self)->size()<=self.asPermission.maxRoleCount 
 
3.2.6 Session Stereotype 
It is established by a user to activate his one or more authorized roles. 
Icon :  
Base Class : UML::AssociationClass 
Parent : N/A 
Tagged Values : N/A 
Constraints : 
[1] It should associate a User stereotyped class with one or more Role stereotyped 
classes. 
inv user_session_roles : 
self.isSession implies self.endType->one(isUser) and self.endType-> 
exists(isRole) and self.endType->forAll(isUser or isRole) 
[2] Activated roles and their all parents should not form a role set that violates the 
DSD constraint. 
inv dsdRule : 
self.isSession implies let sessionAuthorisedRoles : Set(Class) = 
allFamily(activeSessionRoles(self)) in self.allDSDs->forAll(dsd | 
sessionAuthorisedRoles->intersection(sodRoles(dsd))-> 
size()<dsd.extension_SoD.upperLimit) 
[3] In order to activate a role in a session, User who establishes the session must be 
authorized for that role. 
inv userAssignedRolesActivation : 
self.isSession and sessionUser(self)<>null implies 
allFamily(assignedUserRoles(sessionUser(self)))-> 
includesAll(allFamily(activeSessionRoles(self))) 
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3.2.7 ResourceAssignment Stereotype 
It is used to assign a resource to a permission. 
Icon : N/A 
Base Class : UML::Association 
Parent : N/A 
Tagged Values :  
- allowedOperations : Operation [*]: includes Operation stereotyped functions 
belong to Resource end of the association. A user who is authorized for the role 
that is assigned to Permission end of this association, grants right to execute these 
functions. 
- resourceActions : ResourceAction [*]: includes one or more ResourceAction 
enumeration values:  
? READ: execute all Operation stereotyped, getter functions of attributes 
and association ends, and side-effect free functions that do not change the 
state of the system when they are executed, of the Resource. 
? UPDATE: execute all Operation stereotyped, setter functions of attributes 
and association ends, and non-side-effect free functions of the Resource. 
? CREATE: execute constructor function of the Resource. 
? DELETE: execute destructor function of the Resource. 
? FULLACCESS: all CREATE, READ, UPDATE and DELETE rights. 
Constraints : 
[1] It should associate a Resource stereotyped class with a Permission stereotyped 
class. 
inv permission_resource : 
self.isResourceAssignment implies self.endType->exists(isPermission) and 
self.endType->exists(isResource) 
[2] allowedOperations tagged value should include Operation stereotyped functions 
that are owned by Resource end of the association. 
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inv allowedOperationsOwner : 
self.isResourceAssignment implies let resource : Type = self.endType-> 
any(isResource) in resource<>null implies self.asResourceAssignment. 
allowedOperations->forAll(op | op.owner=resource) 
[3] Both allowedOperations and resourceActions tagged values could not be empty. 
At least one of them must contain some elements. 
inv hasOperations : 
self.isResourceAssignment implies 
self.asResourceAssignment.allowedOperations->notEmpty() or 
self.asResourceAssignment.resourceActions->notEmpty() 
 
3.2.8 UserAssignment Stereotype 
It is used to assign a user to a role. 
Icon : N/A 
Base Class : UML::Association 
Parent : N/A 
Tagged Values : N/A 
Constraints : 
[1] It should associate a User stereotyped class with a Role stereotyped class. 
inv role_user : 
self.isUserAssignment implies self.endType->exists(isRole) and self.endType-> 
exists(isUser) 
[2] User end of the association should be already authorized for prerequisite roles of 
the Role end, and prerequisite roles of all parents of this Role end.  
inv prerequisiteRule : 
self.isUserAssignment implies let user : Type = endType->any(isUser), role : 
Type = endType->any(isRole) in (user<>null and role<>null) implies let allPrrs : 
Set (Class) = allFamily(Set{role})->collect(r | prerequisites(r))->asSet() in allPrrs-> 
notEmpty() implies authorisedRoles(user)->includesAll(allPrrs) 
[3] Assignment of a user to a role should not cause violation of the SSD constraint. 
inv ssdRule : 
self.isUserAssignment implies let user : Type = endType->any(isUser), role : 
Type = endType->any(isRole) in (user<>null and role<>null) implies self.allSSDs 
->forAll(ssd | sodRoles(ssd)->includes(role.oclAsType(Class)) implies 
assignedUserRoles(user)->intersection(sodRoles(ssd))-> 
size()<ssd.extension_SoD.upperLimit) 
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3.2.9 PermissionAssignment Stereotype 
It is used to assign a permission to a role. 
Icon : N/A 
Base Class : UML::Association 
Parent : N/A 
Tagged Values : N/A 
Constraints : 
[1] It should associate a Permission stereotyped class with a Role stereotyped class. 
inv role_permission : 
self.isPermissionAssignment implies self.endType->exists(isRole) and 
self.endType->exists(isPermission) 
 
3.2.10 RoleInheritance Stereotype 
It represents a hierarchy between two roles. General end is junior role and specific 
end is senior role. Senior role inherits all assigned permissions of the junior role. 
Users, who are assigned to this senior role, grant these inherited permissions via the 
generalization. 
Icon : N/A 
Base Class : UML::Generalization 
Parent : N/A 
Tagged Values : N/A 
Constraints : 
[1] Both general end and specific end of the generalization should be Role 
stereotyped classes. 
inv role_role : 
self.isRoleInheritance implies self.general.isRole and self.specific.isRole 
[2] It should not cause an inheritance cycle. All parents of the junior role should not 
include the senior role. 
inv inheritanceCycle : 
self.isRoleInheritance implies not self.general.allParents->select(isRole)-> 
includes(self.specific) 
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[3] RoleInheritance should not cause violation of the SSD constraint. 
inv roleInheritanceSSDRule : 
self.isRoleInheritance implies Class.allInstances()->forAll(u | u.isUser implies let 
generalFamily : Set(Class) = allFamily(Set {self.general}) in  authorisedRoles(u)  
->includesAll( generalFamily->union(Set {self.specific})) implies self.allSSDs-> 
forAll(ssd | sodRoles(ssd)-> intersection(generalFamily)->size()>0 implies 
authorisedRoles(u)-> intersection(ssdRoles(ssd))-> 
size()<ssd.extension_SoD.upperLimit)) 
 
3.2.11 SoD Stereotype 
It is an abstract stereotype for Separation of Duties that is a fundamental requirement 
for critical tasks. A critical task should not be completed by a single user in SSD 
context. Operations of a critical task should not be performed in the same session in 
DSD context. 
Icon : N/A 
Base Class : UML::Class 
Parent : N/A 
Tagged Values :  
- separatedRoles : Role [2:*]: includes roles that permissions of a critical task are 
divided among them. 
- upperLimit : Integer [1] = 2: a natural number ≥2 with the property that, 
? in SSD context, no user is assigned to  
? in DSD context, no user may activate in the same session 
this much or more roles included in separatedRoles tagged value. 
Constraints : 
[1] upperLimit tagged value should be a natural number between 2 and the size of the 
separatedRoles array. 
inv allowedRolesUpperLimit : 
self.isSoD implies self.asSoD.upperLimit>=2 and 
self.asSoD.upperLimit<=self.asSoD.separatedRoles->size() 
[2] Each Role that is included in separatedRoles tagged value should be assigned to 
at least one CriticalPermission that has sods tagged value includes this SoD element. 
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inv criticalTaskDividedToRoles : 
self.isSoD implies sodRoles(self)->forAll(role | 
assignedRoleCriticalPermissions(role)->exists(cp | 
cp.asCriticalPermission.sods.base_Class->includes(self))) 
 
3.2.12 SSD Stereotype 
It is used to ensure that roles in an SSD relationship have no common user assigned. 
SSD constraints provide reduced risk and fraud, and increased opportunity for 
detecting errors, since two or more parties are involved in completing a transaction. 
Icon :  
Base Class : UML::Class 
Parent : SoD 
Tagged Values : N/A 
Constraints : N/A 
3.2.13 DSD Stereotype 
It is used to ensure that roles in a DSD relationship are not activated in the same 
session. 
Icon :  
Base Class : UML::Class 
Parent : SoD 
Tagged Values : N/A 
Constraints : N/A 
3.2.14 CriticalPermission Stereotype 
It is assigned to some protected operations of one or more critical tasks. It is a kind 
of permission that can be assigned to only one role. 
Icon :  
Base Class : UML::Class 
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Parent : Permission 
Tagged Values :  
- sods : SoD [1:*]: includes SoD kind stereotyped classes to specify for which SoD 
relations, this permission is created as critical. 
Constraints : 
[1] sods tagged value should not be empty. 
inv emptySoDs : 
self.isCriticalPermission implies self.asCriticalPermission.sods->notEmpty() 
 
[2] CriticalPermission could be assigned to only one role. It should not be shared 
among roles. 
inv onlyOneRole : 
self.isCriticalPermission implies self.assignedPermissionRoles(self)->size()<=1 
 
3.2.15 TimeConstraint Stereotype 
TimeConstraint is used to restrict a Session to be established in only allowed time 
intervals. If a Session is restricted by more than one TimeConstraint, it can be 
established when at least one of these constraints is valid at the establishment time. 
Icon :  
Base Class : UML::Class 
Parent : N/A 
Tagged Values :  
- constrainedSession : Session [1]: a Session stereotyped class that is wanted to be 
restricted. 
- notBefore : String [0:1]:  a String value that represents a time. Before this time, 
constrainedSession cannot be established. 
- notAfter : String [0:1]: a String value that represents a time. After this time, 
constrainedSession cannot be established. 
- period : Period [1] = NONE: includes one of the Period enumeration values; 
NONE, DAILY, WEEKLY, EVERY WEEKDAY, EVERY WEEKEND,                
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BI-WEEKLY, MONTHLY and YEARLY. At these periods within notBefore 
and notAfter time interval, constrainedSession can be established. 
Constraints : N/A 
3.3 OCL Expressions for Profile Constraints 
OCL invariant expressions are used for defining profile constraints. Each constraint, 
which is defined in natural language and in OCL Expression on stereotype elements 
of the RBAC UML Profile (see Section 3.2 stereotype definitions), corresponds to an 
OCL expression that is embedded in its constrained stereotype element as owned rule 
in the profile. Each stereotype element is the context for the OCL Expressions of its 
owned rules.  These OCL expressions are used to validate models if the model is 
well-formed and does not violate any RBAC constraints. OCL expressions are 
created by considering the role inheritance. All defined OCL expressions can be 
found in the XMI format of the proposed UML Profile for RBAC [25]. APPENDIX 
A.1 shows global OCL definitions that are used in OCL expressions for the UML 
Profile constraints. 
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4.  EXAMPLE DESIGN PROBLEM 
In this section, it is introduced a design problem along with its access control 
requirements, as an example for how the proposed UML Profile for RBAC can be 
applied to the design model. 
4.1 Problem Domain Requirements 
It is considered developing a subset of the requirements of a system for hospital 
automation. In this system, there are doctors, nurses, patients and an external system, 
pharmacy system as actors. Each Patient is assigned to one Doctor and one or more 
Nurses. A Doctor can be assigned to more than one Patient. Doctor diagnoses 
diseases of the Patient and creates a medicine order. Nurse can list the medicine 
orders. She selects an order from the list and then picks medicines that are listed in 
that order, from the medicine dispenser. Nurse gives the Patient medications at the 
times specified in the order. External Pharmacy System is responsible for listing the 
medicine orders and loading medicines to the medicine dispenser if it is necessary.   
4.2 Access Control Requirements 
As the thesis proceeds, it will be seen how to formalize a design model for this 
system along with the following access control demands. 
1. Loading medicines to medicine dispenser, creating medicine order and 
picking medicines from the medicine dispenser are operations forming a 
critical task. This critical task should not be performed by a single user. 
2. A user should already grant diagnosing right to create medicine orders.  
3. Only one user, here is the Pharmacy System, can load medicines to the 
medicine dispenser. 
4. Pharmacy System may get reports and status information of the medicine 
dispenser. However, it should not perform these operations when it is loading 
medicines to the medicine dispenser. 
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5. Pharmacy System can load medicines to the dispenser only at a time interval 
12:00-13:00 in a day. 
6. Only Doctors and Nurses can read patient records. Pharmacy System should 
not read patient records even if it can read patient medicine orders. 
Five of these access control demands are samples of RBAC constraints that are 
mentioned in the standard [7]; static (1) and dynamic (4) separation of duties, and 
constraints that are mentioned in [20]; prerequisite (2), cardinality (3) and time-based 
(5) constraints. Remaining one (6) is sample of the user assignment to a role. 
4.3 System Design Model 
While the UML already provides standards for the design of this system in general, it 
does not provide everything necessary for the design of access control specifications. 
Classes [8] can be used for defining the structural aspects of this system. Each class 
formalizes a set of objects with common services, properties and behavior. Figure 4.1 
represents the structural aspect of the problem domain but does not include the 
security aspect of the system for access control specifications. Lack of the security 
elements in this class diagram is the problem. A UML Profile can solve this problem. 
 
Figure 4.1 : Hospital Automation System Class Diagram 
4.4 Security Model 
Core RBAC elements and their relations for the problem domain can be defined by 
analyzing problem domain requirements. Core component stereotypes of the 
proposed UML Profile for RBAC can be used to mark design elements of the 
problem domain as RBAC core elements.  
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Doctor, Nurse and PharmacySystem are Users of the system. Order, Patient and 
MedicineDispenser are Resources that are required to be protected against 
inappropriate or undesired user access. There are some Operations on the protected 
resources, adding disease, applying medicines and reading on the Patient; reading, 
creating and deleting on the Order; dispensing medicines, loading medicines and 
getting reports and status information on the MedicineDispenser. These operations 
should be assigned to some Permissions so they can be performed by users via Roles. 
Therefore, some permissions and roles should be defined.  
Adding disease can be assigned to Diagnose permission that can be assigned to 
Diagnoser role.  Applying medicines can be assigned to Medicate permission that 
can be assigned to Medicater role. Reading patient records can be assigned to 
ReadPatientRecord permission that can be assigned to PatientRecordReader role. 
Reading order can be assigned to ReadOrder permission that can be assigned to 
OrderReader role. Creating and deleting order can be assigned to CreateOrder 
permission that can be assigned to OrderCreater role. Dispensing medicines can be 
assigned to Dispense permission that can be assigned to the Medicater role. Loading 
medicines can be assigned to LoadMedicine permission that can be assigned to 
MedicineLoader role. Getting reports and status information can be assigned to 
ManageDispense permission that can be assigned to DispenserManager role.  
All operation-permission assignments are done by creating relations between 
corresponding Permissions and Resources that enclose the Operations, with 
ResourceAssignment. The Operations that are functions of the Resource stereotyped 
classes, are Operation stereotyped elements.  AllowedOperations tagged value of the 
ResourceAssignments should contain the required Operations. Reading, creating and 
deleting are Resource actions so appropriate ResourceAction enumeration values 
should be included in the resourceActions tagged value of the corresponding 
ResourceAssignments.  
Doctor as a user, should be assigned to Diagnoser, PatientRecordReader and 
OrderCreater roles to fulfill his job. Nurse should be assigned to Medicater and 
PatientRecordReader roles. PharmacySystem should be assigned to MedicineLoader, 
DispenserManager and OrderReader roles.  
All assignments that are mentioned above are done with appropriate association 
stereotypes of core components of the proposed UML Profile. Figure 4.2 illustrates 
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how the core components of the UML Profile for RBAC can be applied to domain 
model of the hospital automation system. As the thesis proceeds, missing parts will 
be added to the model.  
 
Figure 4.2 : RBAC UML Profile Core Components applied to problem domain 
 
In this example system, it is desired that OrderCreater and Medicater roles should 
have ReadOrder permission. Instead of assigning this permission to both roles, they 
may inherit this permission over OrderReader role. This inheritance relation, which 
is depicted in Figure 4.3, could be created with RoleInheritance Stereotype.   
 
Figure 4.3 : RBAC UML Profile Hierarchical RBAC applied to problem domain 
In order to model access control requirements of the example system, constrained 
RBAC elements of the proposed UML Profile can be used.  
Access control requirement (1) mentions a critical task that is formed by loading 
medicine, creating medicine order and dispensing medicine operations. Permissions 
that are assigned to these operations, should be created as CriticalPermissions and 
roles that are assigned to these permissions, should be in an SSD relation. Therefore, 
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LoadMedicine, Dispense and CreateOrder should be CriticalPermissions and 
MedicineLoader, Medicater, and OrderCreater roles should be included in 
separatedRoles tagged value of an SSD stereotyped element. For this critical task, 
MedicineSSD is created and OrderCreater, Medicater and MedicineLoader roles are 
added to the separatedRoles tagged value of this element. It is assumed that, all roles 
in this SSD relation are required to be assigned to different users so upperLimit 
tagged value of MedicineSSD should be 2 which means no user can be assigned to 2 
or more roles that are included in the separatedRoles. CriticalPermissions that are 
mentioned above should contain MedicineSSD in their sods tagged value. 
Access control requirement (2) points out that diagnosing is a prerequisite for 
creating medicine orders. Prerequisite relations are for Roles in RBAC context. 
Consequently, prerequisiteRoles tagged value of the OrderCreater role that grants 
right to perform creating medicine orders operation over CreateOrder permission, 
should include the Diagnoser role that grants right to perform diagnosing operation 
over Diagnose permission. 
Access control requirement (3) is about cardinality constraint for loading medicines 
to the medicine dispenser operation. MedicineLoader role that grants right to perform 
this operation over LoadMedicine permission, should have maxUserCount tagged 
value is set to 1 to cover this requirement. By this way, this role cannot be assigned 
to another user while it is already assigned to a user, PharmacySystem. 
Access control requirement (4) also mentions a critical task that is formed by loading 
medicine and, getting reports and status information of the MedicineDispenser. This 
constraint is about DSD, means these operations should not be performed in the same 
session. MedicineLoader and DispenserManager roles that grant rights to perform 
operations forming this critical task, should be in a DSD relation. Therefore, 
LoadMedicine and ManageDispense should be CriticalPermissions and 
MedicineLoader and DispenserManager roles should be included in separatedRoles 
tagged value of a DSD stereotyped element. For this critical task, PharmacyDSD is 
created and MedicineLoader and DispenserManager roles are added to the 
separatedRoles tagged value of this element. It is assumed that, the roles in this DSD 
relation are required to be activated in different sessions so upperLimit tagged value 
of PharmacyDSD should be 2 which means no user can activate 2 or more roles that 
are included in the separatedRoles in the same session. LoadMedicine and 
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ManageDispense CriticalPermissions should contain PharmacyDSD in their sods 
tagged value. 
Access control requirement (5) refers a time constraint on loading medicines 
operation so a TimeConstraint stereotype should be applied to an element of the 
model. MedicineLoadConstraint is created for this purpose. It should constraint a 
session in that MedicineLoader role that grants right to perform the loading 
medicines operation, is activated. Therefore, MedicineLoadSession association class 
element to that Session stereotype is applied, is created. It associates 
PharmacySystem user with MedicineLoader role. This session should be established 
only at a time interval 12:00-13:00 in a day so tagged values of the 
MedicineLoadConstraint should be set like that constrainedSession is set to the 
MedicineLoadSession, notBefore tagged value is set to 12:00, notAfter tagged value 
is set to 13:00 and period tagged value is set to DAILY period enumeration value.   
Access control requirement (6) is satisfied by assigning Doctor and Nurse users, not 
PharmacySystem user, to the PatientRecordReader role that grants right to reading 
patient records over ReadPatientRecord permission.   
Figure 4.4 illustrates how the Constrained RBAC elements of the UML Profile for 
RBAC can be applied to domain model of the hospital automation system to fulfill 
the access control requirements. 
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 Figure 4.4 : RBAC UML Profile Constrained RBAC applied to problem domain 
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Figure 4.5 : Platform Independent Model of the Hospital Automation System 
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4.5 Platform Independent Model 
The PIM of the hospital automation system, which is depicted in Figure 4.5, is 
constructed by modeling domain requirements and access control requirements 
together by virtue of the proposed UML Profile for RBAC. This model is validated 
successfully which means it is well-formed and does not violate any RBAC 
constraint. 
4.6 Ill-formed Security Model 
Ill-formed security model of the hospital automation system as illustrated in Figure 
4.6 is constructed to constitute design error and constraint violation samples. Whole 
security model elements are not employed in this model to keep the model simple to 
show only elements that could not pass validation check. When the model is 
validated, there are some errors on some elements. All found errors and their reasons 
are described in APPENDIX C.1. Some CASE-tools like IBM Rational Software 
Modeler allow defining custom error and warning messages for violated OCL 
expressions. These messages can be internationalized. Defined error messages for the 
proposed UML Profile for RBAC are in APPENDIX B.1. 
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Figure 4.6 : Ill-formed Security Model of the Hospital Automation System
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5.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis has proposed a UML Profile for RBAC, which provides early integration 
of access control specifications to the entire development process. This study 
employed RBAC constraints to the UML Profile in order to get use of the strengths 
of RBAC, such as separation of duties and cardinality constraints. The models to that 
this profile applied, can be validated against ill-formedness and security constraint 
violations. By this way, design problems can be realized and fixed earlier. A formal 
language; OCL is used for validation. The proposed UML Profile is lightweight, 
easily interchangeable and deployable, and has a wide-range of CASE-tools support. 
In this study, the proposed UML Profile is designed to be used only in UML class 
diagrams, for the structural and static aspects of the system. It can be designed for 
other popular diagram types of UML like sequence diagram and state diagram, for 
the dynamic aspects of the system. If the profile can be used for both static and 
dynamic aspects of the system, it will be more flexible and usable. For example, the 
profile will be applied to state diagrams for the controller-based systems. Session, 
which is one of the core elements of the RBAC, is created at run time in the system. 
It is a dynamic system element so it will be more appropriate to show it in a UML 
diagram that is for dynamic view of the system. In this thesis, it is provided a way to 
put Session element in a class diagram. It will be useful if users cannot drop or add a 
role in an established session, if it is defined at design time which roles will be 
activated in which sessions, or if a session is required to be restricted by a time-based 
constraint. One will create transformation functions for a well-known access control 
infrastructure to examine how the PIM can be used to generate the PSM or generate 
code directly. Employing role delegation feature and temporal constraints [26] into 
the profile will enrich it. 
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APPENDIX A.1  
 
Table A.1 : Global OCL Definitions 
context Classifier 
--Returns parents of the Classifier 
def:  
parents(): Set(Classifier) =  
self.generalization.general 
--Returns all parents of the Classifier 
def:  
allParents(): Set(Classifier) =  
self.parents()->union(self.parents()->collect(p | p.allParents())) 
 
context Element 
--Returns true if the element is a User 
def:  
isUser : Boolean = 
self.oclAsType(Class).extension_User<>null 
--Returns User as a Stereotype 
def:  
asUser : Boolean = 
self.oclAsType(Class).extension_User. oclAsType(RBAC::User) 
--Returns true if the element is a Role 
def:  
isRole : Boolean = 
self.oclAsType(Class).extension_Role<>null 
--Returns Role as a Stereotype 
def:  
asRole : Role = 
self.oclAsType(Class).extension_Role.   oclAsType(RBAC::Role) 
--Returns true if the element is a Permission 
def:  
isPermission : Boolean = 
self.oclAsType(Class).extension_Permission<>null 
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Table A.1 (contd.) : Global OCL Definitions 
--Returns Permission as a Stereotype 
def:  
asPermission : Permission = 
self.oclAsType(Class).extension_Permission. 
oclAsType(RBAC::Permission) 
--Returns true if the element is a Resource 
def:  
isResource : Boolean = 
self.oclAsType(Class).extension_Resource<>null 
--Returns Resource as a Stereotype 
def:  
asResource : Boolean = 
self.oclAsType(Class).extension_Resource. 
oclAsType(RBAC::Resource) 
--Returns true if the element is a SoD 
def:  
isSoD : Boolean = 
self.oclAsType(Class).extension_SoD<>null 
--Returns SoD as a Stereotype 
def:  
asSoD : SoD = 
self.oclAsType(Class).extension_SoD. oclAsType(RBAC::SoD) 
--Returns true if the element is a SSD 
def:  
isSSD : Boolean = 
self.oclAsType(Class).extension_SoD<>null and 
self.oclAsType(Class).extension_SoD. oclIsTypeOf(RBAC::SSD) 
--Returns true if the element is a DSD 
def:  
isDSD : Boolean = 
self.oclAsType(Class).extension_SoD<>null and 
self.oclAsType(Class).extension_SoD. oclIsTypeOf(RBAC::DSD) 
--Returns true if the element is a CriticalPermission 
def:  
isCriticalPermission : Boolean = 
self.oclAsType(Class).extension_Permission<>null and 
self.oclAsType(Class).extension_Permission. 
oclIsTypeOf(RBAC::CriticalPermission) 
 
 
 48
Table A.1 (contd.) : Global OCL Definitions 
--Returns CriticalPermission as a Stereotype 
def:  
asCriticalPermission : Boolean = 
self.oclAsType(Class).extension_Permission. 
oclAsType(RBAC::CriticalPermission) 
--Returns true if the element is a Session 
def:  
isSession : Boolean = 
self.oclAsType(AssociationClass). extension_Session<>null 
--Returns true if the element is a Operation 
def:  
isOperation : Boolean = 
self.oclAsType(Operation). extension_Operation<>null 
--Returns true if the element is a ResourceAssignment 
def:  
isResourceAssignment : Boolean = 
self.oclAsType(Association). extension_ResourceAssignment<>null 
--Returns ResourceAssignment as a Stereotype 
def:  
asResourceAssignment : ResourceAssignment = 
self.oclAsType(Association). extension_ResourceAssignment. 
oclAsType(RBAC::ResourceAssignment) 
--Returns true if the element is a PermissionAssignment 
def:  
isPermissionAssignment : Boolean = 
self.oclAsType(Association). extension_PermissionAssignment<>null 
--Returns true if the element is a UserAssignment 
def:  
isUserAssignment : Boolean = 
self.oclAsType(Association). extension_UserAssignment<>null 
--Returns true if the element is a RoleInheritance 
def:  
isRoleInheritance : Boolean = 
self.oclAsType(Generalization). extension_RoleInheritance<>null 
--Returns assigned Permission(s) of a Role 
def:  
assignedRolePermissions(role : Type) : Set (Type) = 
Association.allInstances()->select(as : Association | 
as.isPermissionAssignment and as.endType->exists(t | t=role))-> 
collect(endType)->asSet()->select(isPermission) 
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Table A.1 (contd.) : Global OCL Definitions 
--Returns assigned CriticalPermission(s) of a Role 
def:  
assignedRoleCriticalPermissions(role : Type) : Set (Type) = 
assignedRolePermissions(role)-> 
select(oclAsType(Class).extension_Permission. 
oclIsTypeOf(RBAC::CriticalPermission)) 
--Returns assigned Role(s) of a Permission 
def:  
assignedPermissionRoles(permission : Type) : Set (Type) = 
Association.allInstances()->select(as : Association | 
as.isPermissionAssignment and as.endType->exists(t | t=permission))-> 
collect(endType)->asSet()->select(isRole) 
--Returns assigned Resource(s) of a Permission 
def:  
assignedPermissionResources(permission : Type) : Set (Type) = 
Association.allInstances()->select(as : Association | 
as.isResourceAssignment and as.endType->exists(t | t=permission))-> 
collect(endType)->asSet()->select(isResource) 
--Returns assigned Permission(s) of a Resource 
def:  
assignedResourcePermissions(resource : Type) : Set (Type) = 
Association.allInstances()->select(as : Association | 
as.isResourceAssignment and as.endType->exists(t | t=resource))-> 
collect(endType)->asSet()->select(isPermission) 
--Returns assigned User(s) of a Role 
def:  
assignedRoleUsers(role : Type) : Set (Type) = 
Association.allInstances()->select(as : Association | 
as.isUserAssignment and  as.endType->exists(t | t=role))-> 
collect(endType)->asSet()->select(isUser) 
--Returns assigned Role(s) of a User 
def:  
assignedUserRoles(user : Type) : Set (Type) = 
Association.allInstances()->select(as : Association | 
as.isUserAssignment and   as.endType->exists(t | t=user))-> 
collect(endType)->asSet()->select(isRole) 
--Returns established Session(s) of a User 
def:  
establishedUserSessions(user : Type) : Set (Type) = 
AssociationClass.allInstances()->select(asc : AssociationClass | 
asc.isSession and   asc.endType->exists(t | t=user)) 
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Table A.1 (contd.) : Global OCL Definitions 
--Returns activated Roles in a Session 
def:  
activeSessionRoles(session : Class) : Set(Type) = 
session.endType->select(isRole) 
--Returns owner User of the Session 
def:  
sessionUser(session : Class) : Type = 
session.endType->any(isUser) 
--Returns prerequisite roles of a role 
def:  
prerequisites(role : Class) : Set (Class) = 
role.extension_Role.prerequisiteRoles-> iterate(r;res:Set(Class)=Set{} | 
res-> including(r.base_Class)) 
--Returns base set union all parents of set members 
def:  
allFamily(baseFamily : Set(Type)) : Set(Class) = 
baseFamily->union(baseFamily-> 
collect(allParents().oclAsType(Class))->asSet()) 
--Returns all SSD stereotyped classes in the model 
def:  
allSSDs : Set(Class) = 
Class.allInstances()->select(isSSD) 
--Returns all DSD stereotyped classes in the model 
def:  
allDSDs : Set(Class) = 
Class.allInstances()->select(isDSD) 
--Returns excluded roles in a SoD 
def:  
sodRoles(sod : Class) : Set (Class) = 
sod.extension_SoD.separatedRoles-> iterate(r;res:Set(Class)=Set{} | 
res-> including(r.base_Class)) 
--Returns authorized roles of a User 
def:  
authorisedRoles(user : Type) : Set(Class) = 
allFamily(assignedUserRoles(user)) 
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APPENDIX B.1  
 
Table B.1 : Error Messages 
OCL Invariant Name Error Message 
operationEncloser 
Operation::operationEncloser | Owner Class of the 
<<operation>> function should be stereotyped with 
<<resource>>. 
role_permission 
PermissionAssignment::role_permission | 
<<permissionAssignment>> Association should connect 
<<role>> Class to <<permission>> Class. 
role_user 
UserAssignment::role_user | <<userAssignment>> Association 
should connect <<role>> Class to <<user>> Class. 
permission_resource 
ResourceAssignment::permission_resource | 
<<resourceAssignment>> Association should connect 
<<permission>> Class to <<resource>> Class. 
allowedOperations 
Owner 
ResourceAssignment::allowedOperationsOwner | 
allowedOperations have an Operation that does not belong to 
assigned Resource. 
hasOperations 
ResourceAssignment::hasOperations | allowedOperations or 
resourceActions should include some elements. 
user_session_roles 
Session::user_session_roles | <<session>> AssociationClass 
should connect <<user>> Class to <<role>> Class(es). 
inheritanceShouldBe
RoleInheritance 
Role::inheritanceShouldBeRoleInheritance | <<role>> Class has 
a generalization that is not stereotyped with 
<<roleInheritance>>. 
Prerequisite 
SelfContain 
Role::prerequisiteSelfContain | prerequisiteRoles contains 
owner <<role>> Class. 
emptySoDs 
CriticalPermission::emptySoDs | sods tagged value of 
<<criticalPermission>> Class is empty. 
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Table B.1 (contd.) : Error Messages 
OCL Invariant Name Error Message 
onlyOneRole 
CriticalPermission::onlyOneRole | <<criticalPermission>> 
Class is assigned to more than one Role. 
inheritanceCycle 
RoleInheritance::inheritanceCycle | <<roleInheritance>> 
Generalization caused an Inheritance Cycle. 
role_role 
RoleInheritance::role_role | general and specific end types 
should be <<role>> Classes. 
maxResourceCount 
Permission::maxResourceCount | maxResourceCount of 
<<permission>> Class is exceeded. 
maxRoleCount 
Permission::maxRoleCount | maxRoleCount of <<permission>> 
Class is exceeded. 
maxRole 
PermissionCount 
Role::maxRolePermissionCount | maxPermissionCount of 
<<role>> Class is exceeded. 
maxUserCount 
Role::maxUserCount | maxUserCount of <<role>> Class is 
exceeded. 
maxAssigned 
RoleCount 
User::maxAssignedRoleCount | maxAssignedRoleCount of 
<<user>> Class is exceeded. 
maxActivated 
RoleCount 
User::maxActivatedRoleCount | maxActivatedRoleCount (in a 
session) of <<user>> Class is exceeded. 
maxResorce 
PermissionCount 
Resource::maxResorcePermissionCount | maxPermissionCount 
of <<resource>> Class is exceeded. 
prerequisiteSSD 
Consistency 
Role::prerequisiteSSDConsistency | prerequisiteRoles violates 
SSD constraint. 
shouldBeInSoD 
Role::shouldBeInSoD | <<role>> Class is not included in 
excludedRoles of SoDs that are included in sods tagged value of 
assigned <<criticalPermission>> Classes. 
allowedRoles 
UpperLimit 
SoD::allowedRolesUpperLimit | upperLimit is not between 2 
and size of seperatedRoles. 
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Table B.1 (contd.) : Error Messages 
OCL Invariant Name Error Message 
criticalTask 
DividedToRoles 
SoD::criticalTaskDividedToRoles | one or more excludedRoles 
are not assigned to a CriticalPermission that its sods tagged 
value includes this SoD. 
dsdRule 
Session::dsdRule | <<session>> AssociationClass associated 
DSD role(s) by exceeding upper limit. 
userAssigned 
RolesActivation 
Session::userAssignedRolesActivation | a <<role>> Class that is 
not assigned to session owner <<user>> Class, is associated 
with <<session>> Class. 
prerequisiteRule 
UserAssignment::prerequisiteRule | associated <<user>> Class 
is not already assigned to the prerequisiteRoles of the associated 
<<role>> Class. 
ssdRule 
UserAssignment::ssdRule | associated <<user>> Class is 
assigned to SSD role(s) by exceeding upper limit. 
roleInheritance 
SSDRule 
RoleInheritance::roleInheritanceSSDRule | <<roleInheritance>> 
Generalization violates an SSD constraint. 
 
 54
APPENDIX C.1  
 
Table C.1 : Errors of the ill-formed security model 
Element Violated OCL Expression Reason 
<<Role>> 
MedicineLoader 
Role:: 
maxUserCount 
Even though its maxUserCount 
tagged value is set to 1, the role is 
assigned to two users, Nurse and 
PharmacySystem. 
<<Role>> 
MedicineLoader 
Role:: 
inheritance 
ShouldBeRole 
Inheritance  
It has a generalization that is not 
stereotyped with 
<<roleInheritance>>. 
<<Role>> OrderCreater 
Role:: 
prerequisiteSelf
Contain 
Its prerequisiteRoles tagged value 
contains itself. 
<<Role>> OrderCreater 
Role:: 
prerequisiteSSD
Consistency 
Its prerequisiteRoles tagged value 
contains Medicater. Medicater and 
OrderCreater roles are exclusive 
roles in the MedicineSSD so this 
prerequisite relation violates the SSD 
constraint. 
<<Role>> 
MedicineLoader 
Role:: 
shouldBeInSoD 
Even though it is assigned to 
LoadMedicine CriticalPermission, it 
is not included in excludedRoles 
tagged value of MedicineSSD that is 
specified in sods tagged value of 
LoadMedicine. 
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Table C.1 (contd.) : Errors of the ill-formed security model 
Element Violated OCL Expression Reason 
<<Operation>> 
printReports() 
Operation:: 
operation 
Encloser 
Owner class of the <<operation>> 
stereotyped function should be 
stereotyped with <<resource>>. Its 
owner class is stereotyped with 
<<user>>. 
<<UserAssignment>> 
(Diagnoser) (Diagnose) 
User 
Assignment:: 
role_user 
It should connect a <<role>> 
stereotyped class to a <<user>> 
stereotyped class but it connects 
Diagnoser role to Diagnose 
permission. 
<<SSD>> MedicineSSD 
SoD:: 
criticalTask 
DividedTo 
Roles 
Medicater role that is included in its 
excludedRoles tagged value, is 
assigned to Dispense 
CriticalPermission but sods tagged 
value of this CriticalPermission does 
not include MedicineSSD. 
<<DSD>> PharmacyDSD 
SoD:: 
allowedRoles 
UpperLimit 
Its upperLimit tagged value is set to 
1 but it should be ≥2. 
<<Session>> 
MedicineLoadSession 
Session:: 
dsdRule 
It associates MedicineLoader role but 
this role is in excludedRoles tagged 
value of PharmacyDSD and 
upperLimit is 1 means no role that is 
included in the excludedRoles can be 
activated. Activated role count in this 
session is not small than upperLimit, 
1. 
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Table C.1 (contd.) : Errors of the ill-formed security model 
Element Violated OCL Expression Reason 
<<Session>> 
DiagnoseSession 
Session:: 
userAssigned 
RolesActivation
Doctor user and Diagnoser role are 
associated by this session but 
Diagnoser role is not assigned to 
Doctor. A User should not activate a 
role if he is not authorized for that 
role. 
<<ResourceAssignment>> 
(Medicine Dispenser) 
(LoadMedicine) 
Resource 
Assignment:: 
allowed 
Operations 
Owner 
Its allowedOperations tagged value 
contains <<operation>> stereotyped 
applyMedicine() function that does 
not belong to MedicineDispenser 
resource.  
<<ResourceAssignment>> 
(Patient) (Diagnose) 
Resource 
Assignment:: 
hasOperations 
Its both allowedOperations and 
resourceActions tagged values are 
empty, which is not allowed.    
<<UserAssignment>> 
(Doctor) (OrderCreater) 
User 
Assignment:: 
prerequisite 
Rule 
OrderCreater role has Medicater role 
as prerequisite role but Doctor user is 
not already assigned to the Medicater 
role. 
<<UserAssignment>> 
(Nurse) (OrderCreater) 
User 
Assignment:: 
ssdRule 
Nurse user is already assigned to 
Medicater role that has an SSD 
relation with OrderCreater role. This 
assignment violates SSD constraint. 
<<RoleInheritance>> 
(senior: OrderReader) 
(junior: OrderCreater) 
Role 
Inheritance:: 
inheritance 
Cycle 
OrderReader role is already junior 
role of the OrderCreater role. This 
inheritance causes an inheritance 
cycle, which is not allowed. 
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Table C.1 (contd.) : Errors of the ill-formed security model 
Element Violated OCL Expression Reason 
<<RoleInheritance>> 
(senior: Medicater) 
(junior: OrderReader) 
Role 
Inheritance:: 
roleInheritance
SSDRule 
OrderReader role inherits 
permissions from OrderCreater role 
that means Medicater role indirectly 
inherits permissions from 
OrderCreater role via this inheritance 
but OrderCreater and Medicater roles 
are in SSD relation. Therefore, this 
inheritance violates the SSD 
constraint. 
<<CriticalPermission>> 
Dispense 
Critical 
Permission:: 
emptySoDs 
It has an empty sods tagged value, 
which is not allowed. Sods tagged 
value should include at least one SoD 
element. 
<<CriticalPermission>> 
Dispense 
Critical 
Permission:: 
onlyOneRole 
It is assigned to both Medicater role 
and MedicineLoader role but it 
should be assigned to only one role 
because it is a CriticalPermission that 
is not sharable. 
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